Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Arbeitspapier

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core concepts is also provided.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 148

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: differential information economy ; rational expectations equilibrium ; coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility ; implementation ; game trees ; private core ; weak fine core ; interim weak fine core ; Rationale Erwartung ; Bayes-Statistik ; Nutzenfunktion ; Spieltheorie ; Asymmetrische Information

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Glycopantis, Dionysius ; Muir, Allan ; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
• (where): Vienna
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72260
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET