Arbeitspapier
On the notion of perfect bayesian equilibrium
Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1446
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
non-cooperative game theory
equilibrium concepts
perfect bayesian
Bayes rule
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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González-Díaz, Julio
Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- González-Díaz, Julio
- Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 2011
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