AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium

Arbeitspapier

In Bonanno (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed notion is the existence of a plausibility order on the set of histories that rationalizes a given assessment. In this paper we study restrictions on the belief revision policy encoded in a plausibility order and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 14-1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: plausibility order ; belief revision ; Bayesian updating ; independence ; sequential equilibrium ; consistency

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bonanno, Giacomo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of California, Department of Economics
• (where): Davis, CA
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109677
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET