Arbeitspapier
AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: Definition and properties
We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency, which has an epistemic justification based on the AGM theory of belief revision.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 10-17
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
belief revision
plausibility order
consistency
subgame-perfect
equilibrium
sequential equilibrium
Bayesian updating
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bonanno, Giacomo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Davis, CA
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bonanno, Giacomo
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010
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