Konferenzbeitrag
Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
We study an informed-principal framework in which the principal chooses the variables the agent is aware of. The agent fits a causal model connecting these variables to the objective probability distribution. The principal may keep her unaware of some variables so that she incorrectly extrapolates how non-equilibrium actions map into outcomes. This framework captures models of contracting with unaware agents, shrouded attributes, and overconfidence in a unified manner.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Contract Theory ; No. G09-V1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schumacher, Heiner
Thysen, Heidi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Schumacher, Heiner
- Thysen, Heidi
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2017
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