Arbeitspapier
A large-market rational expectations equilibrium model
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise traders. The model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3485
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Expectations; Speculations
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- Thema
-
adverse selection
information acquisition
double auction
multi-unit auctions
rate of convergence
behavioural traders
complementarities
Marktmechanismus
Rationale Erwartung
Gleichgewicht
Auktionstheorie
Adverse Selection
Informationsbeschaffung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vives, Xavier
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vives, Xavier
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011