Arbeitspapier
Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games
The rational expectations equilibrium has been criticized as an equilibrium concept in market game environments. Such an equilibrium may not exist generically, or it may introduce unrealistic assumptions about an economic agent's knowledge or computational ability. We define a rational expectations equilibrium as a probability measure over uncertain states of nature which exploits all available information in a market game, and which exists for almost all economies. Furthermore, if retrading is allowed, it is possible for agents to compute such a 'functional rational expectations equilibrium' using straightforward numerical fixed point algorithms.
- Sprache
- 
                Englisch
 
- Erschienen in
- 
                Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 186
 
- Klassifikation
- 
                Wirtschaft
 Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
 Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
 
- Thema
- 
                market game
 rational expectations equilibrium
 Bayesian updating
 learning
 computation
 Rationale Erwartung
 Bayes-Statistik
 Capital Asset Pricing Model
 Spieltheorie
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Shorish, Jamsheed
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
 
- (wo)
- 
                Vienna
 
- (wann)
- 
                2006
 
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Shorish, Jamsheed
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Entstanden
- 2006
 
        
    