Arbeitspapier
Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games
The rational expectations equilibrium has been criticized as an equilibrium concept in market game environments. Such an equilibrium may not exist generically, or it may introduce unrealistic assumptions about an economic agent's knowledge or computational ability. We define a rational expectations equilibrium as a probability measure over uncertain states of nature which exploits all available information in a market game, and which exists for almost all economies. Furthermore, if retrading is allowed, it is possible for agents to compute such a 'functional rational expectations equilibrium' using straightforward numerical fixed point algorithms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 186
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
- Thema
-
market game
rational expectations equilibrium
Bayesian updating
learning
computation
Rationale Erwartung
Bayes-Statistik
Capital Asset Pricing Model
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Shorish, Jamsheed
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
- (wo)
-
Vienna
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Shorish, Jamsheed
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Entstanden
- 2006