Arbeitspapier
Soft Budget Constraints as a Risk Sharing Arrangement in an Economic Federation
We analyze a model where the federal government provides risk sharing arrangements to municipalities investing in a local public good. The risk sharing arrangements are an income equalization system and a system allowing for a soft budget constraint, i.e., a bailout. Our main result is that a bailout system in combination with income equalization can be a more efficient risk sharing arrangement than an income equalization system only. Thus, the introduction of a bailout system is welfare improving.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2006:5
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
Bailout
Fiscal federalism
Finanzbeziehungen
Risikomanagement
Budgetrestriktion
Lokale öffentliche Güter
Einkommensumverteilung
Wirtschaftsmodell
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lindahl, Erica
Westermark, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-83071
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lindahl, Erica
- Westermark, Andreas
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2006
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