Arbeitspapier
Size and soft budget constraints
There is much evidence against the so-called too big to fail hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 172
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
bailouts
soft-budget constraints
jurisdictional size
public goods
spillovers
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Crivelli, Ernesto
Staal, Klaas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2006
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13379
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13379-8
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Crivelli, Ernesto
- Staal, Klaas
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2006