Arbeitspapier
Size and Soft Budget Constraints
There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 18/2006
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
bailouts
soft-budget constraints
jurisdictional size
public goods
spillovers
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Crivelli, Ernesto
Staal, Klaas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Crivelli, Ernesto
- Staal, Klaas
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2006
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Size and soft budget constraints
Size and soft budget constraints
Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints
Provision of social goods and soft budget constraints
An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints
Provision of Social Goods and Soft Budget Constraints
A myth of soft budget constraints in socialist economies
Can EU Conditionality Remedy Soft Budget Constraints in Transition Countries?
Soft budget constraints, European Central Banking and the financial crisis
Institutionalized bailouts and fiscal policy : the consequences of soft budget constraints
Provision of social goods and soft budget constraints
Soft budget constraints: political artefact or economic phenomenon?
Size and soft budget constraints
Size and soft budget constraints
Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints
Provision of social goods and soft budget constraints
An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints
Provision of Social Goods and Soft Budget Constraints
A myth of soft budget constraints in socialist economies
Can EU Conditionality Remedy Soft Budget Constraints in Transition Countries?
Soft budget constraints, European Central Banking and the financial crisis
Institutionalized bailouts and fiscal policy : the consequences of soft budget constraints
Provision of social goods and soft budget constraints
Soft budget constraints: political artefact or economic phenomenon?
Size and soft budget constraints
Size and soft budget constraints
Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints
Provision of social goods and soft budget constraints
An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints
Provision of Social Goods and Soft Budget Constraints
A myth of soft budget constraints in socialist economies
Can EU Conditionality Remedy Soft Budget Constraints in Transition Countries?
Soft budget constraints, European Central Banking and the financial crisis
Institutionalized bailouts and fiscal policy : the consequences of soft budget constraints
Provision of social goods and soft budget constraints