Arbeitspapier
Size and soft budget constraints
There is much evidence against the so-called too big to fail hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1858
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Crivelli, Ernesto
Staal, Klaas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Crivelli, Ernesto
- Staal, Klaas
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2006
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