Arbeitspapier

Bertrand Vs. Cournot: An Evolutionary Approach

In this paper we study an oligopoly game with a differentiated product using a dynamic evolutionary approach. Firms are allowed to choose between quantity setting and price setting behavior. We find that, under both classical interaction structures, namely 'random mating' and 'paying the field'. Quantity setting behavior (i.e., 'Cournot' behavior), is selected as an asymptotically stable state for the dynamics.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 138

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Sacco, Pier Luigi
Scarpa, Carlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
1992

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5222
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Sacco, Pier Luigi
  • Scarpa, Carlo
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 1992

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