Arbeitspapier
On the Endogenous Choice of Bertrand Vs. Cournot Equilibrium in a Duopoly
We try to endogenise the choice between Bertrand Equilibrium (BE) and Cournot Equilibrium (CE) in simple duopoly models. The two distinctive features of this paper as compared to the related literature are the following. First, we take the concepts of BE an CE as fundamental and restict players' choices to these two equilibria. Second, we adopt a forward induction criterion to shrink the Nash equilibrium set of our games. Our findings suggest the BE seems more vulnerable than the CE whenever forward induction is taken seriously.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 91
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Delbono, Flavio
Mariotti, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1990
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5274
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Delbono, Flavio
- Mariotti, Marco
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1990