Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly

Artikel

We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade ; ISSN: 1573-7012 ; Volume: 21 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 33-42 ; New York, NY: Springer US

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Hausbau, Bauhandwerk ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Business Objectives of the Firm ; Firm Organization and Market Structure
• Thema: Corporate social responsibility ; Cournot duopoly ; Asymmetric costs ; Heterogenous firms

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Planer-Friedrich, Lisa ; Sahm, Marco
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Springer US
• (wo): New York, NY
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s10842-020-00335-3
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ