Export taxes under Bertrand duopoly

Arbeitspapier

This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2006/15

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: Trade Policy ; Imperfect Competition ; Oligopoly

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Clarke, Roger ; Collie, David R.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
• (where): Cardiff
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83911
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET