Arbeitspapier
Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test
Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: KOF Working Papers ; No. 185
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Publicly Provided Goods: General
- Thema
-
Terrorism
Decentralization
Democracy
Politische Gewalt
International
Dezentralisierung
Verwaltungsstandort
Politische Entscheidung
Panel
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dreher, Axel
Fischer, Justina A. V.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005510833
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dreher, Axel
- Fischer, Justina A. V.
- ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
Entstanden
- 2008
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