Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test

Arbeitspapier

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: KOF Working Papers ; No. 185

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General ; Publicly Provided Goods: General
• Subject: Terrorism ; Decentralization ; Democracy ; Politische Gewalt ; International ; Dezentralisierung ; Verwaltungsstandort ; Politische Entscheidung ; Panel ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dreher, Axel ; Fischer, Justina A. V.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2008

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005510833
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50349
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET