Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test

Arbeitspapier

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 686

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Publicly Provided Goods: General ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
• Subject: Terrorism ; Decentralization ; Democracy ; Politische Gewalt ; Dezentralisierung ; Verwaltungsstandort ; Politische Entscheidung ; Panel ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dreher, Axel ; Fischer, Justina A. V.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56274
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET