Arbeitspapier

On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the com-petitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur where budget referendums are possible. The reason for this result is that budget referendums reduce the extent to which pro-centralization regions can commit to a low level of spending delegating the centralization choice to elected poli-cymakers. In addition, it reduces the ability of higher level policy-makers to attract additional responsibilities in order to gain policy discretion. Empi-rical findings from a panel data analysis for Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 support this hypothesis.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 615

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure and Scope of Government: General
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Thema
centralization
fiscal federalism
budget referendums

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Feld, Lars P.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schaltegger, Christoph A.
  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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