Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale

Arbeitspapier

The traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to be particularly successful in explaining the extent of tax compliance. We argue instead that a psychological tax contract which establishes a fiscal exchange between the state and the citizens shapes tax compliance to a large extent. In that respect, a case study of Switzerland is useful because the small size of the cantons and their direct democratic political systems procedurally establish a close exchange relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities. In this paper, evidence is discussed on how tax evasion and tax morale in Switzerland evolved over time. In addition, the impact of economic, legal, socio-demographic, psychological and institutional factors on Swiss tax evasion is discussed.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2006-13

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: Tax Evasion ; Tax Morale ; Deterrence ; Responsive Regulation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Feld, Lars P. ; Frey, Bruno S.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214359
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET