Arbeitspapier
Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated
Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or psychological contract. The more strongly the political participation rights are developed, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. In this paper, empirical evidence based on a survey of tax authorities of the 26 Swiss states (cantons) is presented, indicating that the differences in the treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities can be explained by differences in political participation rights.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 322
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Tax evasion
tax authority
tax compliance
direct democracy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Feld, Lars P.
Frey, Bruno S.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Feld, Lars P.
- Frey, Bruno S.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2000
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale
Illegal, immoral, fattening or what?: How deterrence and responsive regulation shape tax morale
Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation
Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis
Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments
Happiness of economists
Happiness of Economists
Happiness of economists
Commitment to Pay Taxes: A Field Experiment on the Importance of Promise
Commitment to pay taxes: Results from field and laboratory experiments
Unerwünschte Projekte, Kompensation und Akzeptanz
Globalisierung ohne Weltregierung
Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale
Illegal, immoral, fattening or what?: How deterrence and responsive regulation shape tax morale
Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation
Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis
Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments
Happiness of economists
Happiness of Economists
Happiness of economists
Commitment to Pay Taxes: A Field Experiment on the Importance of Promise
Commitment to pay taxes: Results from field and laboratory experiments
Unerwünschte Projekte, Kompensation und Akzeptanz
Globalisierung ohne Weltregierung
Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale
Illegal, immoral, fattening or what?: How deterrence and responsive regulation shape tax morale
Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation
Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis
Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments
Happiness of economists
Happiness of Economists
Happiness of economists
Commitment to Pay Taxes: A Field Experiment on the Importance of Promise
Commitment to pay taxes: Results from field and laboratory experiments
Unerwünschte Projekte, Kompensation und Akzeptanz