Arbeitspapier
On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland
We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy cen-tralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in order to internalize spillovers if individual preferences in two jurisdictions are suffi-ciently homogeneous. Under representative democracy, centralization is ineffi-ciently high because representatives can extract political rents by policy centrali-zation. Referendums thus restrict representatives' ability for rent extraction. An empirical analysis using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 supports the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2005-18
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
-
Centralization
Fiscal Federalism
Fiscal Referendums
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Feld, Lars P.
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Schnellenbach, Jan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
- (where)
-
Basel
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Feld, Lars P.
- Schaltegger, Christoph A.
- Schnellenbach, Jan
- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Time of origin
- 2005
Other Objects (12)
On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland
On government centralization and fiscal referendums: a theoretical model and evidence from Switzerland
Effects of Fiscal Rules - 85 Years' Experience in Switzerland
The quest for fiscal rules
Sustainable fiscal policy in a federal system: Switzerland as an example
Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Federal System: Switzerland as an Example
Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction
On tax competition: the (un-)expected advantages of decentralized fiscal autonomy
James Buchanan's theory of federalism: From fiscal equity to the ideal political order
Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss
Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance - New Evidence from Switzerland
Fiscal federalism and economic performance: New evidence from Switzerland
On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland
On government centralization and fiscal referendums: a theoretical model and evidence from Switzerland
Effects of Fiscal Rules - 85 Years' Experience in Switzerland
The quest for fiscal rules
Sustainable fiscal policy in a federal system: Switzerland as an example
Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Federal System: Switzerland as an Example
Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction
On tax competition: the (un-)expected advantages of decentralized fiscal autonomy
James Buchanan's theory of federalism: From fiscal equity to the ideal political order
Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss
Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance - New Evidence from Switzerland
Fiscal federalism and economic performance: New evidence from Switzerland
On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland
On government centralization and fiscal referendums: a theoretical model and evidence from Switzerland
Effects of Fiscal Rules - 85 Years' Experience in Switzerland
The quest for fiscal rules
Sustainable fiscal policy in a federal system: Switzerland as an example
Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Federal System: Switzerland as an Example
Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction
On tax competition: the (un-)expected advantages of decentralized fiscal autonomy
James Buchanan's theory of federalism: From fiscal equity to the ideal political order
Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss
Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance - New Evidence from Switzerland