Arbeitspapier

Effects of Fiscal Rules - 85 Years' Experience in Switzerland

The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules' coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the following: First, fiscal rules at the cantonal level have a negative effect on public deficits, which is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt brakes are rather not associated with substantial evasive measures. Third, cantonal fiscal rules tend to mitigate political budget cycles and shock-related deficits.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6063

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
State and Local Borrowing
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Other Substantive Areas of Law: Other
Thema
Switzerland
fiscal rule
debt brake
budget cycle
election
fiscal shock

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Burret, Heiko T.
Feld, Lars P.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Burret, Heiko T.
  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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