Effects of Fiscal Rules - 85 Years' Experience in Switzerland

Arbeitspapier

The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules' coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the following: First, fiscal rules at the cantonal level have a negative effect on public deficits, which is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt brakes are rather not associated with substantial evasive measures. Third, cantonal fiscal rules tend to mitigate political budget cycles and shock-related deficits.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6063

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; State and Local Borrowing ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Other Substantive Areas of Law: Other
• Subject: Switzerland ; fiscal rule ; debt brake ; budget cycle ; election ; fiscal shock

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Burret, Heiko T. ; Feld, Lars P.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147317
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET