Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Arbeitspapier

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner’s payment is revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue and efficiency. Our findings may have implications for the design of charity auctions, art auctions, and spectrum auctions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 17-053/VII

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Auctions ; Signaling ; Experiments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bos, Olivier ; Gomez-Martinez, Francisco ; Onderstal, Sander ; Truyts, Tom
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/177621
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ