Job market signaling and screening: an experimental comparison

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, more efficient workers invest more often in education and employers offer higher wages for workers who have invested. However, separation is incomplete, e.g., investment does not pay on average for efficient worker types. Increased competition leads to higher wages in the signaling sessions, not with screening. In the signaling version, we observe significantly more separating outcomes than in the screening version of the game.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1794

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
• Subject: Job-market signaling ; job-market screening ; sorting ; Bayesian games experiments ; Arbeitsuche ; Personalbeschaffung ; Bildungsverhalten ; Signalling ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kübler, Dorothea ; Müller, Wieland ; Normann, Hans-Theo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33240
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET