Arbeitspapier
Eliciting information from a committee
The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 692
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
-
Communication
Multidimensional mechanism design
Experts
Collusion
Axiomatic bargaining
Closed rule
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (where)
-
London
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Time of origin
- 2012
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Eliciting Utility Curvature in Time Preference
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Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response
Eliciting Beliefs: Theory and Experiments
Procedures for Eliciting Time Preferences
Order Effects in Eliciting Preferences
Noise and bias in eliciting preferences
Eliciting Paternalistic Preferences: An Incentivised Experiment
Noise and bias in eliciting preferences
Eliciting Utility Curvature in Time Preference
Eliciting individual preferences for pension reform