Arbeitspapier
Procedures for Eliciting Time Preferences
We study three procedures to elicit attitudes towards delayed payments: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure; the second price auction; and the multiple price list. The payment mechanisms associated with these methods are widely considered as incentive compatible, thus if preferences satisfy Procedure Invariance, which is also widely (and often implicitly) assumed, they should yield identical time preference distributions. We find instead that the monetary discount rates elicited using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure are significantly lower than those elicited with a multiple price list. We show that the behavior we observe is consistent with an existing psychological explanation of preference reversals.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9857
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Subject
-
time preferences
elicitation methods
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure
auctions
multiple price list
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Freeman, David
Manzini, Paola
Mariotti, Marco
Mittone, Luigi
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Freeman, David
- Manzini, Paola
- Mariotti, Marco
- Mittone, Luigi
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2016
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