Arbeitspapier
Eliciting information from a committee
The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 692
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
Communication
Multidimensional mechanism design
Experts
Collusion
Axiomatic bargaining
Closed rule
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2012
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