Arbeitspapier
Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 887
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
transparency
reciprocity
reputation
gift exchange
inequity aversion
Arbeitsvertrag
Agency Theory
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Gerechtigkeit
Experiment
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Sliwka, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Irlenbusch, Bernd
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2003
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