Arbeitspapier
The political choice and collapse of fixed exchange rates
Evidence suggests there is a strong tendency among states to choose fixed exchange rates. Yet he interpretation of fixed exchange rates as a monetary policy rule remains unconvincing. Adopting an endogenous policy perspective, this paper argues that political-support maximizing governments choose fixed exchange rates to benefit domestic interest groups. Exogenous shocks, however, may change domestic political equilibria, causing the collapse of international arrangements and the switch to flexible exchange rates. Institutional pecularities make monetary unification a special case in this cycle.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 277
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
International Economic Order and Integration
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- Thema
-
exchange rate regime
monetary union
political economy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hefeker, Carsten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wann)
-
1995
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 1995
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