Konferenzbeitrag
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 ; No. 13
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Lending and Debt Problems
- Subject
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debt crisis
currency crisis
exchange rate regime
Finanzmarktkrise
Auslandsverschuldung
Zahlungsunfähigkeit
Wechselkurssystem
Public Choice
Währungskrise
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hefeker, Carsten
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer
- (where)
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Göttingen
- (when)
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2007
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer
Time of origin
- 2007