Konferenzbeitrag

Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime

The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 ; No. 13

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Lending and Debt Problems
Subject
debt crisis
currency crisis
exchange rate regime
Finanzmarktkrise
Auslandsverschuldung
Zahlungsunfähigkeit
Wechselkurssystem
Public Choice
Währungskrise
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hefeker, Carsten
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer
(where)
Göttingen
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Hefeker, Carsten
  • Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer

Time of origin

  • 2007

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