Arbeitspapier

Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime

The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker's choice of exchange rate regime.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: HWWA Discussion Paper ; No. 298

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Lending and Debt Problems
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Subject
debt crisis
currency crisis
exchange rate regime
Finanzmarktkrise
Auslandsverschuldung
Zahlungsunfähigkeit
Wechselkurssystem
Public Choice
Währungskrise
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hefeker, Carsten
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)
(where)
Hamburg
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hefeker, Carsten
  • Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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