Arbeitspapier
Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty
We study how the optimal degree of conservatism relates to decision-making procedures in a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). In our framework, central bank conservatism is required to attenuate the volatility of monetary decisions generated by the presence of uncertainty about the committee members' output objective. We show how this need for conservatism varies according to the number of MPC members, the MPC's composition as well as its decision rule. Moreover, we find that extra central bank conservatism is required when there is ambiguity about the MPC's true decision rule.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4933
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- Thema
-
monetary policy committees
central bank transparency
central bank conservatism
min-max
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hefeker, Carsten
Zimmer, Blandine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Zimmer, Blandine
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Policy competition, imitation and coordination under uncertainty
EMU enlargement, policy uncertainty and economic reforms
Policy Competition, Imitation and Coordination under Uncertainty
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union
Uncertainty, wage setting and decision making in a monetary union
Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Policy competition, imitation and coordination under uncertainty
EMU enlargement, policy uncertainty and economic reforms
Policy Competition, Imitation and Coordination under Uncertainty
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union
Uncertainty, wage setting and decision making in a monetary union
Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Policy competition, imitation and coordination under uncertainty
EMU enlargement, policy uncertainty and economic reforms
Policy Competition, Imitation and Coordination under Uncertainty
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union
Uncertainty, wage setting and decision making in a monetary union