Arbeitspapier
Trust, communication and contracts: Experimental evidence
We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more trusting leads to higher earnings, and (d) both trustors and trustees favor “fair and efficient” proposals over the unequal proposals predicted by theory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2006-23
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Thema
-
trust game
trust
trustworthiness
reciprocity
Commitment
communication
Vertrauen
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ben-Ner, Avner
Putterman, Louis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Brown University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Providence, RI
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ben-Ner, Avner
- Putterman, Louis
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2006
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Trust and contracts: empirical evidence
Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence
Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence
Communication and trust in principal-team relationships: Experimental evidence
Contracts as reference points : experimental evidence
Employment Contracts and Stress: Experimental Evidence
Contracts as reference points: experimental evidence
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Communication in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence
Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence
Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: Experimental Evidence
Trust and contracts: empirical evidence
Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence
Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence
Communication and trust in principal-team relationships: Experimental evidence
Contracts as reference points : experimental evidence
Employment Contracts and Stress: Experimental Evidence
Contracts as reference points: experimental evidence
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Communication in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence
Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence
Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: Experimental Evidence
Trust and contracts: empirical evidence
Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence
Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence
Communication and trust in principal-team relationships: Experimental evidence
Contracts as reference points : experimental evidence
Employment Contracts and Stress: Experimental Evidence
Contracts as reference points: experimental evidence
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Communication in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence
Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence