Arbeitspapier
Employment Contracts and Stress: Experimental Evidence
A growing literature has found a link between performance-related pay (PRP) and poor health, but the causal direction of the relationship is not known. To address this gap, the current paper utilises a crossover experimental design to randomly allocate subjects into a work task paid either by performance or a fixed payment. Stress is measured through self-reporting and salivary cortisol. The study finds that PRP subjects had significantly higher cortisol levels and self-rated stress than those receiving fixed pay, ceteris paribus. By circumventing issues of self-report and self-selection, these results provide novel evidence for the detrimental effect PRP may have on health.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 838
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
performance-related pay
stress
experiment
cortisol
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Allan, Julia L.
Andelic, Nicole
Bender, Keith A.
Powell, Daniel
Stoffel, Sandro
Theodossiou, Ioannis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
- (wo)
-
Essen
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Allan, Julia L.
- Andelic, Nicole
- Bender, Keith A.
- Powell, Daniel
- Stoffel, Sandro
- Theodossiou, Ioannis
- Global Labor Organization (GLO)
Entstanden
- 2021
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