- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783863042257
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
DICE Discussion Paper ; No 226
- Schlagwort
-
Monopol
Lieferantenmanagement
Glaubwürdigkeit
Kommunikation
Verhandlungstheorie
Vertikale Integration
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Test
Bilaterales Monopol
Monopol
Lieferant
Glaubwürdigkeit
Kommunikation
Verhandlungstheorie
Vertikale Integration
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Testen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wer)
-
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wann)
-
2016
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, düsseldorf university press (dup)
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201608161829
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Möllers, Claudia
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Snyder, Christopher M.
- Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, düsseldorf university press (dup)
- Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2016
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