Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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1432-217X
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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online resource.
- Erschienen in
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Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ; day:4 ; month:6 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-18
Social choice and welfare ; (4.6.2021), 1-18
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s00355-021-01333-y
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021092819210183883978
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Sakai, Ryosuke
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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