Arbeitspapier
Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder's valuation. I derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and show that it can be implemented by introducing a communication stage before an auction. I show that granting bidders a right to remain anonymous, i.e., to refuse participation in the communication stage, leaves the optimal mechanism unchanged and provides no benefits for the bidders.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 23-051
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Mechanism Design
Auctions
Partially Verifiable Types
Communication
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Reuter, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Reuter, Marco
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2023
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