Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1432-217X
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ; day:4 ; month:6 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-18
Social choice and welfare ; (4.6.2021), 1-18
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Creator
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s00355-021-01333-y
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021092819210183883978
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:36 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Sakai, Ryosuke
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Other Objects (12)
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
Online revenue maximization for server pricing
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem
Item pricing for revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly
Revenue maximization in Stackelberg Pricing Games: beyond the combinatorial setting
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions
Ex-Post
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
Online revenue maximization for server pricing
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem
Item pricing for revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly
Revenue maximization in Stackelberg Pricing Games: beyond the combinatorial setting
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions
Ex-Post
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
Online revenue maximization for server pricing
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem
Item pricing for revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly
Revenue maximization in Stackelberg Pricing Games: beyond the combinatorial setting
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions