Arbeitspapier
Ex interim voting in public good provision
We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is ¯nally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If provision is rejected, contributions are reduced by a fee and reimbursed. We compare unanimity with majority voting and both to the baseline of cheap talk. Contributions are highest under unanimity. Yet, results concerning overall e±ciency are mixed. When provision occurs, only unanimity enhances e±ciency. Overall, however, unanimity leads to too many rejections.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2006,23
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Public Goods
- Subject
-
Öffentliches Gut
Abstimmungsregel
Test
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fischer, Sven
Nicklisch, Andreas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fischer, Sven
- Nicklisch, Andreas
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2006
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