Ex post information rents in sequential screening

Arbeitspapier

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-046

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
• Thema: information rents ; sequential screening ; information disclosure

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Krähmer, Daniel ; Strausz, Roland
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103784
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ