Arbeitspapier
Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous studies, which focus on perfect investigations. The contrast exists because if precontractual investigation is perfect, the benefits of sequential screening vanish.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 429
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
Principal agent
information acquisition
sequential screening
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Terstiege, Stefan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17334
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17334-5
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Terstiege, Stefan
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2013