Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information

Arbeitspapier

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this case, silence is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect. As a result, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large. For small groups, a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decisionmaking is to appoint a devil’s advocate.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 10/136

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: experts ; committees ; career concerns ; verifiable information ; information aggregation ; Experten ; Informationsversorgung ; Asymmetrische Information ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hahn, Volker
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-006168697
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171579
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ