- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1878-5166
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency ; day:31 ; month:5 ; year:2020 ; pages:1-21
The review of philosophy and psychology ; (31.5.2020), 1-21
- Classification
-
Psychologie
- Creator
-
Lukitsch, Oliver
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s13164-020-00486-6
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020080222080645301956
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
14.08.2025, 10:49 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Lukitsch, Oliver
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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