- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1878-5166
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency ; day:31 ; month:5 ; year:2020 ; pages:1-21
The review of philosophy and psychology ; (31.5.2020), 1-21
- Klassifikation
-
Psychologie
- Urheber
-
Lukitsch, Oliver
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s13164-020-00486-6
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020080222080645301956
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:49 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Lukitsch, Oliver
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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