Arbeitspapier
Voting Transparency and Conflicting Interests in Central Bank Councils
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central bankers take into account the fact that they might not be re-elected. Thus, the publication of voting records is beneficial since the government can distinguish central bankers in terms of their preferences and can align the central bank council's preferences with those of the general public over time by means of its re-election decisions.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper Series 1 ; No. 2001,03
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Zentralbank
Abstimmung
Publizitätspflicht
Präferenztheorie
Geldpolitik
Public Choice
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hahn, Volker
Gersbach, Hans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Deutsche Bundesbank
- (where)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hahn, Volker
- Gersbach, Hans
- Deutsche Bundesbank
Time of origin
- 2001
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