Price versus Quantity Competition with Cost Sharing

Arbeitspapier

We inspect the interlink between the endogenous choice of price- and quantity- setting behavior in an oligopolic market, and cost sharing among oligopolists. A typical situation of this sort is an oligopoly game where firms invest in product development first, and ten play a marketing game later. Only in the initial investment stage ,the firms set up a joint venture in order to share the costs. We discover that, in the presence of shared costs, the well-established result by Singh and Vives (1984) that firms endogenously choose quantity (resp., price) as a dominant strategy when their products are substitutes (resp., complements) may not be the only equilibrium outcome. In particular, the procedural order between firms` cost sharing decisions and their marketing decisions make a key difference in the resulting equilibrium profiles.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 343

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lambertini, Luca ; Sasaki, Dan ; Poddar, Sougata
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (wo): Bologna
• (wann): 1998

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4966
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159184
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ