Arbeitspapier
Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly with Technological Spillovers: A Welfare Re-Appraisal
We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model where firms activate R&D investments for process innovation. We establish that (i) firms always choose the Cournot behaviour; and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the conflict between social and private preferences over the type of market behaviour disappears.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 389
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2000
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4920
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Mantovani, Andrea
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2000
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