Artikel

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China's listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: China Journal of Accounting Research ; ISSN: 1755-3091 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 211-231 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Klassifikation
Management
Thema
Executive compensation
Voluntary disclosure
Incentives
Performance measures

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Li, Yubo
Lou, Fang
Wang, Jiwei
Yuan, Hongqi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Elsevier
(wo)
Amsterdam
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2013.06.001
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Li, Yubo
  • Lou, Fang
  • Wang, Jiwei
  • Yuan, Hongqi
  • Elsevier

Entstanden

  • 2013

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